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The ethics of African regional and continental 
integration  
  
Dirk Kohnert 
1
 
 
 
Which way Africa : Ubuntu or Nationalism ?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ubuntu - Sankofa bird [Moving forward by looking back] 
2
 vs.  
Zapiro’s view of growing nationalism in Africa 3 
 
 
Abstract : The decision of African leaders on the creation of an African Continental Free Trade 
Area (AfCFTA) in 2018 was not merely a political decision with economic implications. It has 
significant and complex ethical dimensions too. This, not only concerning a possible trade-off 
between economic growth and well-being, employment, remittances, corruption, the depletion 
of natural resources and related ecological and gender problems. AfCFTA will also impact on 
growing xenophobia, nationalism and populism, the likely outcome of growing capital and 
labour mobility.  
 
Résumé : La décision des dirigeants africains de créer une zone de libre-échange continentale 
africaine (ZLECA) en 2018 n'était pas simplement une décision politique ayant des implications 
économiques. Il comporte également des dimensions éthiques importantes et complexes. Cela 
ne concerne pas seulement un éventuel compromis entre croissance économique et bien-être, 
emploi, envois de fonds, corruption, épuisement des ressources naturelles et problèmes 
écologiques et de genre connexes. Le ZLECA aura également un impact sur la xénophobie 
croissante, le nationalisme et le populisme, le résultat probable de la mobilité croissante du 
capital et de la main-d'œuvre.  
 
Keywords : AfCFTA, regional integration, ethics, Sub-Saharan Africa, international 
trade, development aid, post-colonialism, SADC, ECOWAS, CEMAC, CMA, ZLECA   
 
Jel Code : F13, F15, F22, F35, F52, F54, N17, N37, N97, O2, O55, Z1    
                                                 
1
 Associated expert at the Institute of African Affairs, GIGA - German Inst. of Global and Area Studies, 
Hamburg, Germany.  
2
 “Sankofa is a word in the Twi language of Ghana that translates to "Go back and get it" (san - to return; ko - 
to go; fa - to fetch, to seek and take) and also refers to the Asante Adinkra symbol represented either with a 
stylized heart shape or by a bird with its head turned backwards while its feet face forward carrying a precious 
egg in its mouth. … It symbolizes taking from the past what is good and bringing it into the present in order to 
make positive progress through the benevolent use of knowledge.” (Sankofa, Wikipedia) 
3
 Nationalism – the moving spirit behind trans-national cooperation ?  Cartoon - Credit: ZANEWS, June 20, 
2016. Jonathan Shapiro, pen name Zapiro, is a distinguished South African cartoonist.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Economist all over the world are united in maintaining that boosting intra-regional trade is an 
important driver of economic growth. This holds for Africa too which, however, with its share 
below 3% has so far only a marginal role in world trade (Cessac, 2019). On 21 March 2018, 
the leaders of the African Union (AU) signed the new African Continental Free Trade Area 
(AfCFTA; ZLECA or ZlEC, in French) in Kigali, Rwanda in order to create a single market 
for goods and services. The AfCFTA is a key element of the AU’s ambitious Agenda 2063 
(see below). The agreement committed participating countries in general to remove tariffs on 
90% of ‘non sensitive’ goods, to progressively liberalize trade in services, and address 
multiple other non-tariff barrier to trade. This would make Africa the largest free trade area in 
the world. Moreover, its scope exceeds that of a traditional free trade area because it is 
complemented by other continental initiatives, including the Protocol on Free Movement of 
Persons, Right to Residence and Right to Establishment, and the Single African Air Transport 
Market (SAATM) (Songwe, 2019) and the Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the 
Settlement of Disputes (phase 1) and the Protocol on Investment, the Protocol on Competition 
and the Protocol on Intellectual Property Rights (phase 2) (UNCTAD, 2019:3). 
 
Map 1: AfCFTA signatories and ratifying states as of May 2019  
 
 
Source: IMF, 2019: 31 
 
The AfCFTA was heralded as a milestone for regional integration and continental unity 
leading ultimately to a future African Economic Community (AEC). The latter would be the 
last of six successive stages that involve sectoral cooperation, strengthening Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) and finally a continental customs union, a common market 
and a monetary and economic union (ECA, 2012:xv; Luke & MacLeod, 2019). 
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2. Economics of regional and continental integration in Africa  
 
Once completed, the AfCTA would embrace up to 55 AU member states, a market of 1.2 bn 
people with a combined GDP of 2.5 trillion US dollars (IMF, 2019: 72)
 4
,. According to the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), this would constitute a win-win situation for 
African countries in terms of intra-African export growth and overall welfare (UN-ECA, 
2018:4-5; Luke & MacLeod, 2019:67-164). According to UNCTAD too, Africa would benefit 
overall from the agreement, which should bring about $16.1 billion in welfare gains 
(UNCTAD, 2018:1).  
 
Figure 1. Estimated gains from the AfCFTA according to UNCTAD (2018) 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2018: 3  
 
 
Moreover, many of these gains could not been realised if rules of origin will not be designed 
properly and enforced, they are considered by UNCTAD as key to success of AfCTA 
(UNCTAD, 2019).  
 
African leaders integration vision was to be realized first by the consolidation and 
strengthening of the eight regional economic communities (RECs) already recognized by the 
AU. The RECs were expected to serve as building blocks and regional growth poles for the 
envisaged African Economic Community (AEC) (ECA, 2012:3, 11-12). Meanwhile, most 
African countries are part of RECs, and 75 % of intra-regional trade took place in the five 
                                                 
4
 Up to 4 July 2019 all 55 AU-members had signed the AfCFTA, except Eritrea. Hesitant Nigeria had announced 
its intention to join the AfCFTA only on 3 July, shortly before the 12
th
 AU-summit in Niamey, that started on 4 
July 2019. AfCFTA has been legally entered into force already on 30 May 2019 with the ratification by Sierra 
Leone and the Saharawi Republic which met the minimum threshold of 22 countries having ratified, which is 
required under Article 23 of the AfCFTA agreement as precondition to enter into force (Mutesi, 2019). Up to 7 
July 2019 altogether 27 countries had ratified (rfi-Afrique, 2019).  
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most important RECs in 2017, with the SADC alone accounting for half of such trade flows 
(IMF, 2019a:43).  
 
Map 2: African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
 
Source: IMF, 2019: 36 5 
 
However, there are still major stumbling blocks on the road to success. At the 12
th
 AU-
summit in Niamey (4 to 8 July 2019) five major areas of clarification and negotiation were 
identified (here and in the following, Cessac, 2019):  
 
First, institutions will have to be created to conduct and co-ordinate the future negotiation 
process. These include notably the headquarters of the permanent AfCFTA general secretary 
and its host country
6
. The secretary would have to manage among others the harmonization of 
tariffs and the definition of rules of origin. Another body to be created would be the African 
Trade Observatory with the task to supervise the technical and legal aspects of the agreement 
and to propose solutions for the harmonisation to the secretariat.  
 
                                                 
5
 “Dotted border for AMU indicates the free trade area is not fully implemented. AMU, Arab Maghreb Union; 
CEMAC, Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa; COMESA, Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa; EAC, East African Community; ECOWAS, Economic Community of West African States; 
EFTA, European Free Trade Association; EU, European Union; GCC, Gulf Cooperation Council; Mecosur, 
Southern Cone Common Market; PAFTA, Pan-Arab Free Trade Area; SACU, Southern African Customs Union; 
SADC, Southern African Development Community; WAEMU, West African Economic and Monetary Union.” 
(IMF, 2019: 36). 
6
 Potential candidates were Egypt, Kenya, Ghana, and  Madagascar (Cessac, 2019). 
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Second, a list of tariff-free products and services will have to be agreed upon which should 
comprise lastly 90% of ‘non-sensitive’ tariff-lines in the liberalized African market over a 
transition period of five years valid for the 21 non-least developed countries, and ten years for 
the 33 least developed countries (LDCs). Some 90% of all tariff lines would be subject to 
progressive tariff cuts. The remaining 10% of tariff lines would include ‘sensitive products’ 
that could be liberalized over ten years by the non-least developed countries and 13 years by 
LDCs as well as a carefully identified list of goods excluded from liberalization (UNCTAD, 
2018: 2). This will include the arduous task of identifying exemptions from liberalization by 
each country concerned.  
 
Third, common rules of origin will have to be assigned, including thresholds on the 
proportion of ‘African’ inputs that qualify for being considered ‘Made in Africa’. A threshold 
of 50% has been proposed, but already disputed by concerned governments, NGOs and Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs) in both directions (for details see, UNCTAD, 2019).  
 
Fourth, the hairy question of non-tariff barriers to trade will have to be solved. As a fist 
measure, online platforms to deal with complaints about non-tariff barriers have been 
suggested, based on the example of the Tripartite Free Trade Area
7
 that apparently had 
resolved already 85% of complaints in that area since 2010. A study of the Afreximbank 
estimated that the gains of tariff liberalization by AfCFTA to the tune of US$ 3.5bn could be 
increased to US$ 17bn if all non-tariff barriers would be eliminated too (Cessac, 2019).  
 
Last, but not least, a continent-wide system of convertible currencies would have to be 
established. The Afreximbank, which has been proposed as future clearing-house, has 
designed already a system especially suited for small and middle enterprises, still based on the 
own currencies of buyers and sellers, to facilitate international payments. 
 
Whereas, according to the AU’s ambitious forecasts, intra-African trade will increase by up to 
60% by 2022, model-calculations by the UNCTAD are less optimistic. They foresee trade 
increase of 15% to 25% up to 2040, in absolute figures 50 to 70 bn US$, depending on the 
degree of liberalization (faz, 2019:xxyy). Critics of the AfCFTA, such as the Third World 
Network Africa (TWN-Africa, Accra), the African Center For Children Rignts (C.A.D.E. 
Kinshasa, DR Congo), and the Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt (CADTM, 
Liège, Belgium) remain sceptic (Cessac, 2019). For example, they refer to the lack of 
complementary of most African economies and the subsequent danger that the dumping of 
cheap imports could harm especially the smaller producers in agriculture, manufacture and 
nascent local industries. According to TWA-Africa, problems are to be expected notably in 
the African agro food sector. They fear that primarily multinational companies with African 
subsidiaries are likely to benefit from AfCFTA and that the gap between the rich and the poor 
African producers and countries would be further accelerated (Cessac, 2019).  
 
One pre-condition of boosting trade by the AfCFTA would be that the question of existing 
multiple non-tariff barriers to trade would be solved, which are especially pronounced in West 
Africa with its large share of informal sector. For example, more than 85% of businesses 
active in Togo operate in the informal sector according to the latest global business survey 
carried out across the country by the national statistics institute (INSEED; Togo-First, 2019). 
The share of the informal sector in neighbouring Benin has been estimated by the IMF around 
                                                 
7
 The Tripartite Free Trade Area comprises the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Southern 
African Development Community and the East African Community. 
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50% and in Nigeria 65% (IMF, 2019:72-75; Medina et al, 2017:13). Secondly, Nigeria, by far 
the biggest and most influential African economy next to South Africa, sign the treaty only 
hesitantly, last but not least, because it wanted to protect its infant industry. Only under 
pressure from its peers and influential Nigerian businessmen such as billionaire Aliko 
Dangote, Nigeria’s president Buhari finally decided to join the AfCFTA on the eve of the 12th 
AU-summit in Niamey on 4 July 2019 (Cessac, 2019). This reluctance the more remarkable 
as it contrasted sharply with Nigeria’s former role of spearheading African integration, e.g. 
concerning the fight for independence of Zimbabwe and to end South African’s Apartheid 
regime. Evidently, the driving force behind Nigeria’s uncompromising stance in the early 
days of Africa’s liberation from the bonds of colonialism were shared moral values and ethics, 
even if it would negatively affect the country’s economy (Uche Ordu, 2019).   
 
Figure 2: The Role of RECs in African Trade and their Export Composition 
 
 
 
Source: IMF, 2019: 37 8 
 
 
In short, the AfCFTA is based on high-flying visions indeed in view of the ambiguous 
progress of regional integration since the surge of African RECs in the 1970s and the varying 
commitment of governments to support it. While characterized by ambitious targets, they 
have had a dismally poor implementation record (Hartzenberg, 2011). Apparently, lacking 
political will to yield sovereignty, missing sense of regional identity, trust and common 
interests, have been identified as major causes of poor performing regional institutions. The 
latter are in the end only what individual member states wish them to be (Tavares & Tang, 
2011:226).  
 
This may have been one of the reasons why the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA) cautioned already in its base-line study of the AfCFTA in 2012 that the 
reluctance of some countries ‘to liberalize their borders to trade is a common concern and 
may only be overcome if the gains from such liberalization are shared’ (ECA, 2012:4-5). This 
holds the more so, because intra-regional trade within Sub-Sahara Africa remained rather low, 
although it increased substantially in the past three decades from approximately 5 % in 1990 
                                                 
8
 “Source: United Nations COMTRADE Database and IMF staff calculations. Note: AMU = Arab Maghreb 
Union; CEMAC = Central African Economic and Monetary Community; COMESA = Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; SADC = Southern 
Africa Development Community.” (IMF, 2019:37).  
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to about 12 % in 2017
9
 and estimated 15% to 17% in 2019 (see figure 2). In contrast, almost 
two thirds of African exports go to Europe. This compares unfavourably to intra-trade levels 
in Europe (69%), Asia (59%), and North America (31%) (Songwe, 2019:98). 
 
Figure 3: Intra-African and major trade partner’s trade share, 1990-2017  
 
  
                Source: IMF, 2019a: 41 10 
 
In contrast to Africa’s export to the outside world, which was mainly focused on raw 
materials, notably minerals (e.g. oil and copper), intra-regional exports within the African 
continent were more diversified and had a higher technological content (IMF, 2019 a:42; see 
figure 3).  
 
Figure 4: Intra-African Trade versus Trade with the Rest of the World, 1990–2017  
 
 
Source: IMF, 2019: 41 
 
In summary, there are still serious limiting factors of regional integration, like the poor 
infrastructure development, the large informal sector, contested rules of origin and other non-
tariff barriers to trade, and last but not least, lacking political will of the African national elites 
to cede national sovereignty in favour of pushing forward regional integration. Moreover, 
repeated resurgence of pan-Africanism since the early days of African independence in the 
1960 and the call for African Renaissance in the 1990
th
 were countered by new nationalism 
(Kohnert, 2009) impeding effective regional integration.  
 
                                                 
9
 “These statistics underestimate actual intraregional trade flows though, as they do not capture widespread 
informal cross-border trade. Nevertheless, the share of trade with African countries by 2017 was surpassed only 
by trade with the European Union and with China, which has been rising fast in the past decade.” (IMF, 2019 a)  
10
 “Sources: UN-COMTRADE database; and IMF staff calculations. - Note: Trades shares are defined as the 
average of two ratios: (1) Share in total African exports and (2) share in total African imports. EU = European 
Union” (IMF, 2019a:41). 
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While it is broadly recognized that globalization and increased world-wide trade resulted in 
substantial growth in the past three decades, its gains apparently have not been fairly 
distributed
11
. Although global poverty decreased, prosperity has not been shared (Songwe, 
2019:97). Today, seven of the 10 most unequal countries worldwide are located in Africa 
(Index-Mundi, quoted in IMF, 2019a:50). 
 
Under these conditions, neither economic incentives along Ricardian comparative advantages 
of trade nor monetary compensation for those countries that do not profit directly from 
liberalization, as strongly recommended by the ECA, will suffice to guarantee the success of 
the AfCFTA. This the more so, because the distribution of gains of increased trade openness 
induced by AfCFTA will probably remain quite uneven which could affect the already highly 
skewed income distribution even further.  
 
Forecasts of the probable effects of increased trade openness, induced by the AfCFTA, on 
income inequality suggest though a significant difference between agricultural- and natural-
resource-based African economies on the one hand and manufacturing exporters on the other. 
Whereas in the former inequality would decrease slightly by 4.6%
12
, in the latter trade 
openness would increase inequality by 1.5% (IMF, 2019a:50). A recent UNCTAD study 
cautioned that the success of AfCFTA in a more competitive global economy would require 
also to assist the potential losers through job retraining, targeted social protection and other 
welfare measures that mitigate the negative effects (UNCTAD, 2019:10). 
 
Figure 5: Change in Gini coefficients and income shares by AfCFTA according to IMF 
 
 
Source: IMF, 2019a: 50  
 
According to the IMF, the impact of the AfCFTA on the inequality of income distribution 
would be even greater, if the large informal sector, that is generally associated with higher 
inequality, would not shield a large share of the population against negative impact of formal 
trade openness (IMF, 2019a: 51). However, this ‘shielding effect’ – which in itself already 
contributes to increasing inequality as recognized by the IMF (see above) - would only be 
effective under the heroic assumption that the informal sector is producing mainly non-
tradable goods and services, which are not affected by increased trade-openness (IMF, 2019a: 
51, Fn13). This assumption seems to be quite unrealistic in view of available studies on 
informal trade in West Africa (Golup, 2012; Kohnert, 2016) and elsewhere in Africa. 
                                                 
11
 “The World Bank population-weighted Gini index shows that inequality rose steeply between 1988 and 1998 
and declined only moderately by 2013.” (Songwe, 2019:98). 
12
 “In natural resource exporters, inequality decreases less than in the case of an agricultural exporter. While 
natural resource activities are capital intensive and favor richer capital owners, these activities are also taxed 
more heavily, providing additional resources for redistribution.” (IMF, 2019a:50, Fn.12). 
9 
 
Consequently, income inequality induced by AfCFTA would probably be considerable greater 
because the shielding effect will be less pronounced than assumed. 
 
Yet, even for the ECA, implementing the AfCFTA is about more than trade. ‘It is about 
dispelling the “crisis of implementation” of AU decisions and initiatives and validating the 
African Union and its Agenda 2063. It is a litmus test of the commitment of African countries 
to economic integration.’ (ECA et al, 2019:64). Consequently, there are supplementary 
variables to be accounted for if one wants to evaluate the chances of African regional and 
continental integration. By now, it should be clear that the balance between the ‘politics of the 
belly’ (Bayart, 1993) and shared ethics play a central role in the African economic integration 
process too. While there exist a wealth of literature on the adverse effects of the ‘politics of 
the belly’ (Bayart, 1993; Berman, 1998; Daloz, 2018), ethics are rarely thematised in the 
context of African regional integration. Yet, possibly even different ethics will be required for 
the successive stages of African economic integration: firstly, ethics focussed on integration, 
and subsequently ethics centred on participation in order to consolidate the gains of 
integration, like in the building process of the European Union (Bellamy & Warleigh, 1998). 
The ethics of participation would include also human rights, conflict prevention and peace 
building. Two of the RECs, the ECOWAS and SADC made already a first step in this 
direction in encouraging ‘good governance’, the rule of law and respect for peace, democracy 
and human rights (Brown, 2005).   
 
Figure 6: desirable political environment for regional and continental integration  
 
 
Source: ECA et al, 2019a: 7  
 
 
 
3. Ethical dimensions of African integration  
 
3.1  African aspirations  
 
When the African leaders celebrated the 50
th
 anniversary of the OAU in 2013, the predecessor 
of the AU, Pan-Africanism as well as Africa’s cultural heritage and its renaissance, its 
integrity and further development, figured high on the agenda for obvious reasons. The 
leaders committed themselves to eight key ‘priority areas’ for development, among them 
African renaissance, continental integration, and inclusive social and economic development 
(AUC, 2014: 6; DeGhetto et al 2016:93). Based on these ‘priority areas’ they launched the 
Continental Agenda 2063, i.e. ‘Africa’s blueprint and master plan for transforming Africa into 
the global powerhouse of the future’ (AU, 2016:2). The Agenda 2063 embraced seven major 
‘aspirations’, including the vision of ‘an integrated continent, politically united based on the 
10 
 
ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance, (Aspiration 2)’, ‘an Africa 
with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics (Aspiration 5)’13 as 
well as ‘people-driven development, relying on the potential of African people … (Aspiration 
6)’ (AU, 2016:2; DeGhetto et al 2016:95). A program with detailed goals, priority areas, 
targets and indicative strategies, flagship programmes and a first 10-year implementation-plan 
were presented with Agenda 2063 framework document (AU, 2015)
14
.  
 
In short, continental integration was (only) one of eight priority areas, and it remains to be 
seen in how far African governments are really committed to implement the agenda and to 
yield national sovereignty despite all enthusiastic rhetoric of the documents and public talks 
of African leaders. One of the key questions in this respect is the question of ownership which 
unfortunately, had not been addressed in the Agenda 2063 plan of action (DeGhetto et al 
2016:98-99)
15
: Do all the signatory countries have the same understanding and a shared 
roadmap to attain the AfCFTA in spite of differing cost and benefits?  
 
Apparently, shared understanding of the AfCFTA depends to a significant extend on shared 
values and ethics. However, it is open to question whether there exists a distinctive African 
view on fairness and retributive justice, supposedly the most important ethics in this respect. 
On the contrary, according to lessons learned from recent scholarly studies, an unique single 
framework of an African ethic does not exist, but a chorus of different voices (Murove, 2009). 
Although these voices contain distinctive common strands, the latter apply typically only to 
specific contexts and social groups. Moreover, African ethics, like ethics worldwide, are not 
static and engraved once and for all, but continuously developing and adapting to current 
conditions (Nicolson, 2008).  
 
Up to now, the ethics of integration in Africa concerned mainly an elite-driven process of 
regional and continental integration, i.e. a discreet policy of integration pushed by 
governments and background lobby groups of major economic players involved. In this 
respect, the ethics of African integration resemble that of European ‘integration by stealth’, an 
expression borrowed from Bellamy & Warleigh (1998:453-455). That is, in the early phase of 
integration the general public has been treated largely as passive and acquiescent. However, 
the newly created institutions and forums of integration and conflict resolution provided also 
for an ongoing and gradual shift of loyalty of national elites to new supra-national (regional 
and continental) centres of decision and created thereby additional trans-national arenas of 
power-play with repercussions on the national and sub-national level. 
 
                                                 
13
 Comprising the goal of “Africa cultural renaissance … inculcating the spirit of Pan Africanism; tapping 
Africa’s rich heritage and culture to ensure that the creative arts are major contributors to Africa’s growth and 
transformation; and restoring and preserving Africa’s cultural heritage, including its languages.” – “We aspire 
that by 2063: • Pan Africanism will be fully entrenched; • The African Renaissance has reached its peak; 
Culture, heritage and a common identity and destiny will be the centre of all our strategies so as to facilitate a 
Pan-African approach and the African Renaissance.” (AU, 2016: 8).  
14
 In addition, an AU Ethics Office was established in July 2016 as an independent advisory body superintending 
ethical matters in all African Union Organs, institutions and offices. Its key goals are too cultivate an enduring 
respect for ethical principles and standards derived from the African Union values as well as promote good 
governance.  
15
 “Who owns Agenda 2063? Is it the AU and its organs, the heads of states and governments who originated the 
idea, the AU member states, the regional bureaucrats and technocrats (New Economic Partnership for Africa 
(NEPAD); African Development Bank (AfDB); United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)), the 
people and societies of Africa and her diaspora, or some combination of the above? Indeed, the AUC asserts 
that prior continental frameworks (e.g. Lagos Plan of Action, Abuja Treaty) demonstrate that the citizens of 
Africa must own the process and outcome of Agenda 2063, but the question of ownership needs to be further 
clarified because it has significant implications for buy-in, commitment, resourcing, monitoring, and effective 
and sustaining implementation.” (DeGhetto et al 2016:98-99).  
11 
 
As long as African integration remains a process driven by the political and economic power-
elite the question of ownership applies apparently for the ethical guidelines as well that drive 
this process. That is, first of all, we have to focus on the ethics of this power-elite.  
 
Moral values in Africa and elsewhere are directly related to social class and class 
consciousness. It determines the common scale of values and ethics and is the driving force 
behind the class’s social agency. Apart from the evident pan-African principles mentioned 
above, there are other ethics that come into play. Even if these often act rather oblique they 
are not necessarily less important. These beliefs are determined to a great extent by religion. 
In fact, religion provides according to Siegfried F. Nadel (1954:259) an ‘economic ethic’, i.e. 
‘normative ethic’ in the language of current social and political philosophy, which provide  
guidelines for action. In the realm of politics these break down to political or public ethics.  
 
Following Max Weber’s social psychology of world religions, this has been confirmed for 
Africa already 80 years ago by a classic of ethnology of African societies and religions, i.e. S. 
F. Nadel’s painstaking case study of the Nupe in the 1930 and 1940s (Nadel, 1942:123). 
Nadel analysed in detail the long-established distinct standards of moral order and values for 
the nobility and the ‘commoner’ in colonial Northern Nigeria that are largely based on 
religion. That is, more exactly on religions in plural, because in Nupeland, as elsewhere in 
Africa, different sources of missionary efforts of Muslim and Christian warriors and 
missionaries that conquered the Nupe in the past centuries, intermingled so closely with the 
‘pagan’ beliefs they encountered locally (Nadel, 1954:259) that a separate analysis is hardly 
possible and justified only out of academic scrutiny in an ideal-typically sense. Although 
meanwhile about 80 years old, these ‘economic ethics’ have been uphold to a large extend up 
to date (Kohnert, 1982; Muhammad, 2017). Presumably, this holds for the whole of Sub-
Sahara Africa, at least concerning the basic traits of  African ‘economic’ or normative ethics.  
 
In the following, I shall therefore focus on ethics and moral guidelines provided by the most 
influential religions in Africa, i.e. Christianism, Islam and traditional African religions and its 
implications for regional and continental integration. Certainly, it is not to be excluded that 
there are also other sources of moral codes than religion, e.g. established ancient custom, 
often restricted to local settings, ethnic- and regional networks and even the extended family. 
Last, but not least, we must not forget the strong influence of Western philosophical 
traditions, including political liberation theories, imported from the West in the course of the 
first and second liberation of Africa, and the impact of African independence movements on 
contemporary African ethics. Therefore, Gyekye and others caution about a too rigid 
concentration on Islam and Christian belief in dealing with African ethic (Gyekye, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the broad spectre, relevant for the discussion of the impact of ethics on African 
regional integration, will be encompassed by the focus on the religious base of ethos and the 
derived agency of the power-elite, at least, if we include traditional African religions as well. 
This the more so, because in Africa it is rather the rule than the exception that a true believer, 
both of Christianism and Islam, is convinced that the faith in crucial elements of African 
religions, last, but not least in the occult, like witchcraft, is perfectly compatible with the 
restrictions of monotheism (Geschiere, 1997; Kohnert, 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
3.2  Modern Christian movements : an answer to counteract Africa’s 
increasing integration into globalized capitalism ?  
 
At this point, the articulation between traditional and modern African values and ethics 
becomes relevant. Africanists observed that the rise of global capitalism especially in Africa 
has been enhanced and consolidated by new Christian movements that offer to explain the 
seemingly inexplicable trends induced by the moral economy of global capitalism, like the 
reification of social relations, increasing materialism, egoism and social cleavages between 
the rich and the poor (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000:307-308). It is not by chance that the 
connection between globalised capitalism and occult economics which took place in the wake 
of the second wind of change in the 1990s in sub-Saharan Africa reminds of a manifestation 
of Marxist concepts of alienation (Entfremdung), objectification (Vergegenständlichung), and 
commodity fetishism in the spiritual African world (Kohnert, 2007:44). The new protestant 
ethics of capitalism, that have been offered by Pentecostal churches mushrooming all over 
Sub-Saharan Africa, apparently provide convincing answers – tailored to their own needs and 
to boost their personal gains - by articulating occult believe systems of African traditional 
religions with adapted modern Christian believes in witchcraft and sorcery (Geschiere, 1997; 
Kohnert, 2007). Thus, in Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and other countries all over Sub-Sahara 
Africa, faithful new-born Christians looked for comfort and spiritual protection from the 
diabolic powers of the world market. Quite worldly problems, such as diminishing terms of 
trade, falling farm-gate prices of local export crops, increasing unemployment, and 
indebtedness were explained within the context of their religion. The concerned population 
might even see in these witch-hunters heroes who cleanse their areas of evil, rather than view 
them as evil itself. Thus, under certain historical conditions, witch-hunts constitute what Peter 
Geschiere (1997), quoting D. C. Martin, called a "popular mode of political action", directed 
towards promoting the dawn of a new democratic order, towards equalizing the distribution of 
income and wealth, or towards, defending the ideal of solidarity within acephalous village 
communities (Kohnert, 2007:47). 
 
Within the realm of informal politics too, the systems of checks and balances has been 
connected repeatedly to ‘vodun politics’, i.e. the active involvement of secret cults, the 
politics of vigilance and ritual murder for example in Nigeria. The power which secret cults in 
Nigeria wield in contemporary life and in regional politics is still considerable, and has been 
continuously adjusted to the requirements of modern politics, from pre-colonial times up to 
present-day political structures of formal multi-party democracy (Kohnert, 2007:44). 
 
In the nascent capitalist order in Africa apparently one of the most promising ways to acquire 
economic and political power lies in the transgression of established moral in order to produce 
sur-plus value by all available means, fair or foul (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000:308). In 
principle, the religious-ethical legitimation of the selfish pursuit of worldly wealth by 
rewarding it in heaven is nothing new, although this has been considered to be highly 
unethical in African traditional religions (see below). In fact it has been explored in detail 
since the publications by Adam Smith, the founder of classical economy theory. He maintains 
in his Wealth of Nations that the self-centred pursuit of one’s own interest promotes 
unintentionally - guided by the invisible hand of the market – the societal gain even more 
efficiently as if man would actively intend to promote it. His theory was complemented and 
13 
 
developed further by Max Weber’s path-breaking analyses on the Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism.
16
  
 
Yet, in modern Africa, the occult aspects of African religions that have been incorporated into 
protestant ethics and have been instrumentalized since long by Muslim African rulers as well, 
are not restricted to the realm of economics. They extend to power-politics of national elites 
too. Cases studies are abound. They stretch from the alleged ‘poisoning’ scandals of political 
adversaries for the presidency in Benin, labelled as the ‘Quartier Latin of Francophone 
Africa’ (N. Soglo vs. M. Kérékou in the 1990s, P. Talon vs. Boni Yayi in 2012; see Kohnert 
& Preuss, 2019), over ethnic militias and vigilante groups, closely cooperating with secret 
cults, financed by Governors and influential politicians in Nigeria to intimidate political 
opponents (Harnischfeger 2003:29-35), to the occult politics and personality cults of Zaire’s 
Mobutu Sese Seko (White, 2005), Liberia’s Samuel Doe (Ellis, 2001) and Togo’s Eyadéma 
Gnassingbé (Toulabor, 1993).  
 
 
3.3  ‘Protestant Islam’: the key enabler of ‘rationalised’ Muslim ethics of 
the political elite in SSA ?  
 
Habitually, Muslim ethics in Africa are differentiated between the ‘good’ Islam, equated in 
general with ‘moderate’ Sufism on the one hand, and ‘bad’ reformist ‘Wahhabism’ of 
allegedly Islamist provenience) on the other, promoted and co-financed for decades by radical 
Arab Muslim sources, notably in the most populous African nations, Nigeria and Sudan. Boko 
Haram and other radical Islamist in the Sahel region threaten not only the very existence of 
their own nations but also Western interest. However, it would be misleading to reduce 
African Islam to such an over-simplified dichotomy because, according to Soares and Otayek, 
the number of African Muslims who affiliate neither with ‘Sufism’ nor with ‘Wahhabism’ is 
far greater than the number of those who do (Soares & Otayek, 2007:7).   
 
Decolonized forms of Islamic identity have been aptly analyzed by Donald Wehrs (2008) by 
means of examples from narratives of writers from Francophone Africa. Wehrs well describes 
the self-critical tenor of Islam, notably its suspicion of the "idol-making" propensity of elites. 
Moreover, he shows Islam’s propensity to distinguish ethical selfhood from unchecked and 
thus self-deifying and irresponsible autonomy.  
Thus, Wehrs and the African writers on whom his study is based challenge Western scholarly 
postcolonial criticism by giving a voice to those who evocate Islamic ethical discourse within 
narratives addressing the trauma of decolonization in Muslim socio-political contexts. This 
would be a sound base for actual African leaders who favor an African way to enhanced 
regional and continental integration too.  
 
Yet, although the exploitation of African occult beliefs in modern Christian denominations is 
less pronounced in Muslim societies, in Africa apparently developed similar trends to a 
‘Protestant Islam’. According to a long-standing expert in African Islam, Roman Loimeier a 
‘second Islamization’ transformed Muslim societies in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 19th and 20th 
century, resulting in a process of secularization in Max Weber’s sense of a gradual 
‘rationalization’ of religion and society (Loimeier, 2005:247-248), notwithstanding the 
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African traditional religion and ethics are incompatible with the protestant ethics of capitalism which makes for 
the quest for a new truly African economic ethic (Murove, 2005). 
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incorporation of traits of allegedly ‘irrational’ African religious custom, used for political 
purposes as well. Thus, in Senegal for example, Muslim brotherhoods, notably the Mourids 
and Tijaniyyah, have been considered the grey eminences behind Senegal’s presidential 
candidates since independence in the 1960s. Candidates run for ‘advice’ and support of their 
religious mentors. Political transhumance on suggestion of religious leaders, for which 
Senegal became notorious, assumed virtual religious dimensions in defiance of morality, 
unwittingly following Adam Smith’s maxim of self-centred agency as most efficient means to 
promote the public good. It was considered most dangerous for political stability and peace of 
the country, last but not least in view of the background of the presidential elections of 2019 
(Kohnert, & Marfaing, 2019:6).  
 
Another case study of the political instrumentalization of Islam, inseparably intermingled with 
elements of traditional African religion, by the local political elite, is derived from Nupeland 
(Bida Emirate), Northern Nigeria, where various Etsu Nupe (Muslim emirs) used a religious 
African secret cult, the ndako gobya, since pre-colonial times as informal police to protect the 
interest of their class and the public order of the Nupe state (Nadel, 1942: 141-149; Kohnert, 
2007a). 
 
 
3.4 Traditional African religions: the veiled base of African ethics ?  
 
Since about ten years, corresponding with current trends of scholarly discussion, Africanist 
and African philosophers focused on a new distinctive approach of analysis of African ethics. 
Ronald Nicolson (2008), Felix Murove (2009), Kwame Gyekye (2010) and A. E. Orobator 
(2011) count among the major proponents of this discussion. Not by chance, the first two  
collected editions originated at the University of Kwa-Zulu-Natal, which is well-known 
because of its long history of anti-apartheid activism of its staff and students, like Steve Biko, 
the founder of the Black Consciousness Movement, at the University of Natal. The latter 
merged with University of Durban-Westville in 2004 to form the Kwa-Zulu-Natal university.   
 
Nicolson’s collection ‘Persons of Community’ focused on common African ethics, notably 
the meaning of Ubuntu, and its embeddedness into the global culture. Ubuntu denotes the 
African view that a person becomes a person mainly through his fellow human beings. It 
attaches a great value to consensual decision making, including the famous, though often 
misunderstood institution of ‘palaver’. Nevertheless, this connotation has been misused 
several times by scrupulous African dictators to legitimate their autocratic rule by regress to 
established African custom. In this respect, African ethics, like ethics worldwide, represent 
not only a wide range of different ethics, but they are also quite often subject to manipulation.  
Although most scholars maintain that Africa ethics are derived from religion they differ from 
Western and Arabic ethics in so far as, unlike Christianity and Islam, African religions are as 
a rule no ‘revealed’ religions, concentrating on a single mythical founder to whom it was 
revealed and who thus becomes the only and sole authority in religious and moral questions 
(Gyekye, 2010 : n.p.). Rather they represent the long history of people’s own reflections on 
their society and the whole world. Although they too in general maintain the notion of a single 
and common Good, who, however, remains in the far distance of the universe, it is no 
supernatural ethic but one that places a central value on reciprocity, focussing rather on duties 
vis à vis one’s fellow beings, rather on individual human rights (Gyekye, 2010: n.p.).   
 
I a nutshell, those African leaders, notably the Pan-Africanists among them, who are in favour 
of greater regional or even continental integration, like the father of political Pan-Africanism, 
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Kwame Nkrumah, are well-advised to gain additional legitimacy of their bold call in rallying 
it with African ethics that request unification, as Ubuntu. Yet, that does not exclude opponents 
of regional and continental integration, like the ‘Gradualists’ and their forefathers Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, Julius Nyerere or Cheikh Anta Diop, to use other ethics, equally deeply-rooted 
in the universe of African cultural tradition, focussing for example on ‘reciprocity’ concerning 
their demand for a more cautious step-by-step approach, e.g. linked to the concomitant 
advances in actual economic integration or even in pleading for ‘splendid isolation’.  
 
 
4. Ethical justifications of African fragmentation ?  
 
The ‘Gradualists’ may get, whether wanted or not, support from another deeply-rooted 
African custom, the belief in witchcraft and sorcery. Occult belief systems are still widespread 
in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa and to be found in all social strata, including Western 
educated politicians and clerics as shown above. Moreover, they are negatively correlated 
with trust and the erosion of social capital, as well as with additional anti-social traits like 
charitably giving and participation in religious group activities (Gershman, 2016)
17
.  
 
Even more, occult belief and the new African nationalism are mutually reinforcing. 
Witchcraft accusations thus are also a by-product a concomitant movement of resurgent 
nationalism and growing xenophobia. The new nationalism in Africa and elsewhere shows 
remarkable differences both in its roots and its impact, compared with that of national 
independence movements of the early 1960s. Contrary to the first nationalism, the second is 
less prone to include than to exclude populations; alienation, xenophobia and its political 
instrumentalization are its curse. The new nationalism has been shaped decisively by the 
consequences of globalization and by the increasing cleavages between the poor and the rich. 
Nowadays, structures of nationalism and nation-states differ more than in the past. Frequently, 
the new nationalism is rooted in populist grass-root movements which do not necessarily 
share the same interest as the ruling class or the state. This makes for its extraordinary 
political and social ambiguity and brisance (Kohnert, 2008).  
 
Whether the ideology of ‘Ivoirité’ or ‘Togolité’, national strategies of exclusion as a means of 
politics find compliant imitators everywhere, in Africa and elsewhere. The new formal-
democratic rules of the game introduced with the 'second wind of democratization' in sub-
Saharan Africa (starting in the 1990s) aroused increasing fears of being overruled and 
overpowered by strangers. Communitarian African culture that had so far been characterized 
by the integration of 'the other' as well as hospitality in the broadest sense, have had a long 
tradition and was protected by cultural institutions (social adoption, patronage, etc.). Today, 
social integration in Africa is in acute danger, not least as a result of an Eurocentric political 
liberalism, as propagated (maladapted) by Western development aid that, with its manifest 
effects, that are causing increasing social isolation and exclusion (Kohnert, 2005).   
 
Development projects, which constitute arenas of strategic groups in their struggle for power 
and control over project resources, are likely to add further social stress to an already 
endangered precarious balance of power, causing witchcraft accusations to flourish. 
According to many Africans witchcraft is increasing due to social stress and strain caused 
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 By the way, African traditional religions, like Christianism and Muslim faith too, have a distinctive gender 
bias, being determined by its patriarchal hierarchy (Orobator, A. 2011:7). This gender bias is arguably a major 
source of the belief in witchcraft and sorcery.  
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(among others) by the process of modernization. Most often magic and witchcraft accusations 
work to the disadvantage of the poor and deprived, but under particular circumstances they 
become a means of the poor in the struggle against oppression by establishing "cults of 
counterviolence." Magic and witchcraft beliefs have increasingly been instrumentalized for 
political purposes. Apparently they can be used to support any kind of political system, 
whether despotic or democratic (Kohnert, 1996).  
 
 
However, there are also signs of hope. Despite globalized ethics, based on Christianism or 
Muslim faith, there are not only African belief systems, but also genuine African cultures of 
innovation that could be used by African leaders to promote African unification. These 
cultures of innovation largely accrue from the informal, not the formal sector (Kohnert, 2011).  
 
Apparently, the cultural stimuli of change are not restricted to inherited value systems or 
religions, such as a Protestant ethic or Confucianism; rather, they are continually adapted and 
invented anew in a globalized world. For example, there is no evidence of the supposed 
superiority of the innovative culture of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants versus that of 
African entrepreneurial migrants. Rather, there exist trading diasporas which have a generally 
enhanced innovative capacity vis‐à vis local entrepreneurs, regardless of the national culture 
in which they are embedded. This has been demonstrated in taking the case of the rivalry of 
Chinese and Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs in African markets. This rivalry does not 
necessarily lead to the often suspected cut‐throat competition. Often the actions of each group 
are complementary to those of the other. Under certain conditions they even contribute to 
poverty alleviation and sustainable development (Kohnert, 2010).  
 
 
5.  Conclusion   
 
Thus, the overriding aim of this article has been to demonstrate that the decision of African 
leaders on the AfCFTA is not merely a political decision with economic implications, but it is 
one that has significant and complex ethical dimensions, not only concerning a possible trade-
off between economic growth and well-being, employment, remittances, corruption, the 
depletion of natural resources and related ecological and gender problems, but also because of 
probable indirect effects of growing labour mobility, including growing xenophobia, 
nationalism and populism. However, the is hardly any valuable alternative to regional 
integration induced by globalization. Because without regionalism and devolution unfettered 
growth along the neo-classical model would reign the world with all its negative effects on the 
most backward regions and economic sectors, the poor and other disadvantaged social strata, 
especially in Africa (Sideri, 1997). Guidelines for an ethical leadership in Africa would have 
to respect the actual cross-cultural commonalities and differences (Eisenbeiß & Brodbeck, 
2014) of the multitude of ‘ethics brewed in the African pot’ as analysed above.  
 
.    
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